“Soccer” as we Americans refer to it, is simply another sport within our society that has its share of leagues, clubs, and fanatics. In Brazil, however, it is their society—it embodies all that is Brazil. Brazilians live to play and watch soccer, it is in their blood. The 2014 FIFA World Cup is being held in Brazil for the first time since 1950. Yet, surprisingly, a poll taken in Brazil to determine whether Brazilians actually wanted to host the World Cup showed that 52% of the population was against it. It seems that there is more to the country than scoring goals. Many Brazilians framed the World Cup within the context of human rights and handed out yellow cards to a government that cared more about enabling the world’s obsession with soccer than with taking care of its own people. Brazil, already crime filled country, in hosting the World Cup opened up 12 of its cities to millions of soccer enthusiasts, some of whom would undoubtedly contribute to their worsening crime problem, which includes child prostitution and drugs. Young children selling their bodies in order to survive another day is not the kind of economic benefit the Brazilians were counting on as hosts of the World Cup. Moreover, the allocation of monetary resources has also become a controversial topic. Many are asking why Brazil even submitted a bid to host the World Cup given the 11 billion dollars it would require to repair/build 12 soccer stadiums that will each host only 4 matches. Many of these stadiums will become abandoned following the conclusion of the World Cup. Such monies would be far better spent in other areas such as education, particularly in a country where many children don’t even have access to schools and where gang warfare competes with child prostitutution as extracurricular activities.. Additionally teachers and workers have been demanding higher wages at the very time as the government has sunk the public largesse into the World Cup. Brazil hosted the World Cup hoping to improve its infrastructure, healthcare, and education—yet it doesn’t not appear that such goals will be met as time runs down and the last balls sail wide on this World Cup.
After losing the Republican primary election for the Seventh District of Virginia, Eric Cantor (R–VA) will be stepping down from his role as House Majority Leader. Cantor, a rising star in the Republican Party, announced Wednesday that his resignation would be effective July 31, in a primary election loss he called a “personal setback.” David Brat, his opponent, is an economics professor whose victory many are attributing to the increased sway of the Tea Party.
Cantor was twice a guest of the Forum, having visited us in 2010 and, more recently, in September 2013. In a discussion at the 92nd Street Y with Forum Director Thane Rosenbaum, he spoke about the then-hot-button issue of the Syrian crisis, his experience as a Jewish Republican leader, and, of course, the growing influence of the Tea Party in national politics.
A video of the entire discussion is posted below, courtesy of the 92nd Street Y.
From a legal and political standpoint the decision to annex Crimea was simply outrageous, to quite literally the entire world. However, what happens when we start to consider the desires of the people who actually live in Crimea. The people, who voted, had a referendum and came out on the other side. The ones who speak Russian, live their lives as ethnic Russians, but have not historically, since the separation, been part of the Russian Federation. Is the world, purely from a legal and political standpoint allowed to say, no you cannot be part of the country you ethnically and culturally feel most at home. You speak the same language, you share cultural traditions, but because the rest of the world says so, you cannot join the rest of your “tribe.”
Should it matter to us at all that the great majority of the people outraged by this event are those that are not actually impacted by it? Is it fair that the countries that are putting forth their dislike for the annexation are not looking at the best interests of those in Crimea but rather the interests of themselves and others with which they are in alliance. I recently had a conversation to this effect and the strongest argument I heard was what happens when Quebec decides it officially wants to be part of France and France accepts and annexes it. Well, to this I respond two-fold. Geographically such an annexation would make far less sense than what has occurred in Crimea but also Quebec has had referendum and the votes have not come out as those in Crimea. By no means am I supporting Putin’s actions in eastern Ukraine and invading, I simply am raising the moral questions about how the world is treating the decisions of the Crimean people and what may be considered “fair” to them.
While few will dispute Putin has an interest necessarily in the well-being of Crimea, maybe, to accomplish what many might consider what is morally fair to those in Crimea, we must employ Machiavelli and simply say the ends justify the means. The fact that there is a group of people happier now to be part of the Russian Federation than they previously were as part of the Ukraine should be sufficient to make those expressing their outrage over the matter a little bit calmer. Perhaps, with all of the political hoopla that has occurred since the annexation, the politicians have forgotten that their actual purpose is to work on behalf of people and their happiness. If then, the people in Crimea are happy, should the world be doing anything?
On March 26, 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) in Chicago granted Northwestern University football players the right to unionize (a monumental ruling that could drastically alter the institution of college athletics as we know them today. In short, this decision grants the Northwestern football players the right to vote on whether they want to be represented by the College Athletes Players Association (“CAPA”), who initiated this action with support from the United Steelworkers Union. The most profound part of this decision by NLRB Regional Director Peter Ohr is his conclusion that: “players receiving scholarships to perform football-related services for the Employer under a contract for hire in return for compensation are subject to the Employer’s control and are therefore employees [under NLRA § 2(3)]…”. This characterization of NCAA athletes as employees has the potential to shatter the entire foundation of American college athletics—the idea (or myth) of the “student-athlete.”
While this NLRB ruling is groundbreaking, its immediate impact will be more limited than many believe. First, the authority of this decision is limited to students attending private schools because state labor law still governs athletes at public institutions. In fact, many of the best college football programs are located in the south and mid-west, where most of the states have right-to-work laws, which are not union-friendly and will make it more difficult for players at these schools to unionize. Second, the CAPA has said that—at least immediately—it will not bargain for pay-for-play terms that are prohibited by the NCAA, and would make its member athletes ineligible. Instead, the CAPA appears focused on bargaining for improved player safety, medical insurance to cover the long-term effects of injuries sustained while participating in college athletics, and scholarships that truly cover the full cost of attendance.
As expected, the NCAA is ardently opposed to the NLRB’s characterization of their “student-athletes” as “employees,” and filed an appeal with the NLRB main office in Washington, DC. The NCAA and its member schools continue to view athletics as activities that are used to enhance students’ overall college experience and are not the main purpose for the students’ attendance at the school. In its request for appeal, Northwestern shamelessly claims that scholarship football players are not “initially sought out, recruited and ultimately granted scholarships” for their athletic ability, but rather for their academic prowess.
Really Northwestern? You recruit your major Division I football team because of their biology and trigonometry grades? Let’s be real, scholarship athletes attend their respective schools to perform a service for the institution—to make them money through their performance on the playing field—and are compensated for their efforts through scholarships that include detailed conditions for realizing this payment for their services. It is time that the myth of the “student-athlete” is put to rest. Only time will tell whether this groundbreaking decision by the Chicago NLRB will have a lasting effect on college athletics. But good for you, Northwestern football, for challenging the NCAA to be honest with itself; and congratulations to the NLRB for not succumbing to the outside pressure and characterizing the relationship between scholarship athletes and their schools as it is, a true employer-employee relationship.
A custody battle in California over a child conceived through artificial insemination has become a controversial First Amendment debate. Jason Patric, a Hollywood actor, and his ex-girlfriend, Danielle Schreiber, are engaged in a custody fight over their four-year-old son, Gus. California law dictates that the mother of the child will receive full custody unless parental rights are established in writing before conception through artificial insemination.
As part of his campaign to obtain custody of Gus, Patric created the organization Stand Up for Gus to raise awareness of parental alienation for fathers in similar situations. Patric has used Gus’s name and likeness as part of the promotional campaign surrounding Stand Up for Gus. Schreiber subsequently sued Patric, allegedly that Patric is exploiting Gus for his own fame and using the media to garner support for his case. At stake in the lawsuit is an injunction that would bar Patric from even mentioning Gus’s name.
The outcome of the suit has the potential to set precedent not only for parental rights in cases of artificial insemination but also important First Amendment implications. As reproductive technology changes rapidly, the law has been slow to keep up with the corresponding custody issues. As this case highlights, the very right to speak about one’s child may be implicated in custody rights. This becomes more complicated when sperm donors are involved, since many would argue that they gave up their right to custody before conception even began.
Perhaps the level of publicity involved in this case sets up a unique situation in which custody should be required to use a child’s image and name on such a large scale. However, limiting a father’s right to speak his child’s name seems to step too far across First Amendment boundaries. The custody suit itself seems to imply the need for Patric to articulate a relationship with Gus and to establish the necessary connection between himself and his son. No doubt issues involving custody and technology will continue to evolve into unanticipated legal questions such as those that have arisen with the Patric case.
I have been unable to see anything in capital punishment but a penalty the imagination could not endure, and a lazy disorder that my reason condemned.
—Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine
Due to the seemingly unwavering string of acts of extreme violence in America, there has been a resurgence in public debate about capital punishment. It’s always surprising to hear the alacrity of condemnation coming from the mounts of so many of my compatriots. They make it seem like the death penalty is the only rational end to dealing with a mass murderer. Can that be so? After intently absorbing, in person, through the media, off the written page, the arguments of many pro-capital punishment claimants, I struggled to find anything convincing in the conclusions that they reached.
Let’s first tally the three most common arguments that repeatedly came from the mouths and the minds of death penalty advocates: (1) considering the feelings of retribution and need for closure by those close to the victims of crimes; (2) providing a proportional punishment to the severity of the crime; and (3) that the death penalty acts as a deterrent to society. I will now lay them out before you, demonstrating the immorality and illogicality in this style of thinking.
The first argument frequently heard from defendants of this particularly unsettling attitude is: what if one parented, or was married to, a victim of a murder? As if to say this natural human proclivity toward revenge justifies capital punishment. Entertaining this morose idea, I would have to agree that it’s very plausible that I would wish death onto my loved one’s slayer. But justice and human passion are not congruous. If human passion was the best arbiter of justice then why did we, as a society, go to all the trouble of creating law and order?
Secondly, many believe it is morally sound to take from one that which they took from another; in other words, “an eye for an eye, a tooth from a tooth.” Many legal systems throughout history are predicated on that very tenet—none more famous than the Code of Hammurabi. But let’s apply Hammurabi’s code to all crimes. If someone is convicted of theft, do authorities rob the robber? If someone else is convicted of battery, it is righteous to bludgeon the wrongdoer? There’s not much that can be said in defense of the claim that the Code of Hammurabi is an archaic system created by a barbarous mind. But, somehow, it remains copacetic to murder a murderer. The ordering of the American punitive system, systemically, kicks the stilts out from underneath the ‘criminal’s comeuppance’ pro-capital punishment argument.
A third pro-capital-punishment argument, and one that seems to surface the most (especially in the public forum) is that capital punishment is an ironclad deterrent, forcing members of society to genuflect in fear. Jeffery Toobin of the New Yorker recently published an article about the decline of capital punishment in America, which said that 315 death sentences were handed down in 1994, compared to only 78 in 2012. It went on to say that during that same period, the murder rate also plunged, “rendering especially hollow the traditional argument that the death penalty serves as a deterrent.” The article concludes that the death penalty “now exists in a kind of twilight, a fading but still significant presence in America life.”
For a punishment to be a deterrent—an exemplary undertaking—it must merit fear inside the people. Yet, as the passage above points out, the drop in court-ordered death sentences didn’t result in a greater murder-rate. Yet, in fact, the opposite occurred. Even more significant, the murder rates remain stagnant in the 100 or so nations that have wiped the death penalty from their judicial system. Knowing this, is it possible to deduce that capital punishment is an effective intimidator?
Of all the methods of capital punishment, lethal injection runs counter to the claim that the death penalty keeps the public in line. For most, there’s nothing intimidating about a needle; nothing that strikes the fear of God into the frenzied killer seconds before an attack (expect in cases where it fails). Throughout history there’ve been plenty of methods that could very easily deter one away from bloodlust, from the guillotine and the gallows, to dismemberment and a fiery stake. Compared against these petrifying methods, lethal injection seems like a ride on a rowboat. But these historical methods are something, I assert, that modernity has outgrown. Hence, the exemplary argument has no business being voiced in a country that administers its justice through a vein. In fact, if the point of capital punishment is to be an example, then making it a public spectacle should not only be advisable but mandatory; complete with the stark macabre that chills the public’s blood.
Capital punishment, above all things, deems a person unfit for living, and this should never be the concern of “a jury of one’s peers”—putting it a different way: society. Society created itself by unification, so it can, if it so chooses, deem a member unworthy of being a part of the whole. Its concern, concordantly, ought to never extend beyond this question: can we (society) grant one of our own the title of lifelong outcast? By virtue of what society is and how it came about, no graver punishment can be dispensed without the label of injustice.
In March 2014, the State of Michigan passed a law prohibiting insurance companies from covering abortion services unless customers purchase “riders” to their plans ahead of time. Effectively, this law (termed the “Rape Insurance Law” by local Democrats) will make it illegal for insurance companies to provide coverage for abortion procedures on regular medical coverage plans. To get coverage, women will have to sign a separate rider, and pay extra for the added insurance. And these rules will apply even in the event that the woman is seeking to abort a pregnancy caused by rape or incest (hence the nickname), or out of a threat to her life or health. But perhaps most alarmingly, coverage will only be available through employer-based insurance plans. Meaning, women who buy their own individual policies cannot purchase the abortion rider, and must bear the full financial burden of any abortion procedures on their own.
In a state where 23,230 abortions were performed in 2012, and only 4 percent were paid for by insurers, lawmakers should pause and consider the effect of this new rule. According to a study in the Women’s Health Issues medical journal, fourteen percent of women who have undergone an abortion procedure have delayed or failed to pay rent as a result of the costs of the procedure. Sixteen percent couldn’t afford food, and thirty percent couldn’t pay other utilities and bills. In the first trimester, an abortion procedure alone can cost upwards of $500, and that’s without the added expenses of lost work, additional childcare, and travel costs. In the second or third trimester, those costs can climb to over $10,000, especially when the procedure involves a hospital (as many recent anti-abortion laws require). For low-income families, that may be tantamount to financial ruin.
So perhaps, supporters of this ‘Abortion Opt-Out Plan’ might say, women should be more careful about finding themselves carrying unwanted pregnancies. Well, maybe. But what about victims of rape? In the view of Michigan Senate Minority Leader Gretchen Whitmer, a rape survivor who voted against the law, forcing victims to bear the financial costs of abortion procedures is downright unimaginable. Even Republican Governor Rick Snyder, who vetoed a similar bill last year, argued it is inappropriate to tell a woman who becomes pregnant as a result of rape that she should have planned for the costs of being sexually assaulted. And what about women who are forced to terminate wanted pregnancies out of medical necessity? The law isn’t restricted to covering only “elective abortions.” It will also limit coverage for medically necessary abortions, forcing some women to face financial ruin for “doing nothing more than trying to start a family.” So you might be wondering, what is the purpose of this law? According to Right to Life Michigan spokeswoman Genevieve Marnon, it’s because Right to Lifers shouldn’t have to pay for the costs of other women’s abortions. But I wonder, Michigan lawmakers, has it occurred to you who will bear the burden of paying for these procedures? In light of the fact that Marnon has outright stated that the organization does not anticipate that abortion rates will decrease as a result of the new law, it’s quite alarming to think about who this law will be punishing. That is, families facing the trauma of losing a wanted pregnancy, victims of rape, and the poorest citizens of the State of Michigan. So in the sentiment of State Representative Marcia Hovey-Wright, chairwoman of the Women’s Democratic Caucus, doesn’t this law actually seem like a tremendous embarrassment to the State of Michigan?
After the tragic disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, many have wondered if the families of the victims have any legal recourse. Under the Montreal Convention, an agreement governing international air carriers, airlines must pay the relatives of each victim $150,000 to $175,000 in the event of a fatal accident. According to Article 21(2) of the Convention, an airline is liable for a plaintiff’s damages unless the airline can prove that it was without fault or the accident was caused solely by a third party. It is likely that the victims’ families will prevail under the Convention as Malaysia Airlines will have difficulty proving that the airline was not negligent considering that two of the passengers used stolen passports to board the plane. Additionally, many experts have suspected that a catastrophic mechanical failure or fire caused the plane to fail. Thus, Boeing Co., the manufacturer of Flight 370’s aircraft, may also be held liable for negligence.
However, legal claims have yet to be filed, and the victims’ families have not received compensation. With the plane still missing, the passengers’ health is considered unknown so relatives cannot collect damages for fatalities, especially without the known cause of the accident. Though not a lawsuit, Ribbeck Law recently filed petition for discovery in Chicago’s Cook County Circuit Court, but the suit was dismissed for “exceed[ing] the allowable scope.” However, if the plane is not discovered after a period of a few months, judges may rule that the passengers are presumed dead which would allow relatives to move forward with claims against Malaysia Airlines and/or Boeing Co. Aviation attorneys and other analysts predict that once this occurs, or once the plane is discovered, families could recover anywhere from $3 million to $6 million. Though this sum will not replace the victims’ families’ loss, legal claims may allow the families to move forward from this tragedy.
Even when we don’t repeat history, we live in its wake. Recently, the discovery of over 500 pieces of artwork in the home of an heir of a Nazi-era art dealer has incited discussion of not only ownership, but on a visceral level, guilt. Cornelius Gurlitt, the owner of the pieces, has captured the media’s attention under suspicions that the artwork was obtained by theft or through sale under duress during Mr. Gurlitt’s father’s tenure as a buyer of artwork for Hitler and ultimately the Führermuseum.
The response to these allegations has been one of judgment and for many a call to action. The intuitive response is that the artwork no more belongs in Mr. Gurlitt’s hands than it did in the hands of the man who commissioned the acquisition. However, even as I write these words, the question remains, where do right, wrong, and legal intersect?
As experts determine the provenance of Mr. Gurlitt’s art collection, nowhere in America is there credible discussion of restitution for Native Americans or African Americans. While some might distinguish that the art was stolen, the tangible harm is not meaningfully different. If we examine carefully the concept of restitution, it is as much a remedy as it is a penance. To the extent that the transgressions I’ve illustrated cannot be made right through any means, we must acknowledge that restitution is merely symbolic. If that is correct, there is a significance both in whom we hold accountable, and when we choose not to.
The choice to pursue Mr. Gurlitt’s artwork is not a merit-based assessment in which some arbiter of fact has established that the artwork is somehow more meaningful than restitution to African Americans or Native Americans. Instead, it reflects a societal value assessment that attribute a greater evil to the acts of men such as Mr. Gurlitt’s father rather than our American ancestors. While we are ready to hold modern Germans accountable for the acts of their ancestors, and perhaps we should, we have not recognized our own culture’s injustices as being significant in the same light. Although we may not be equipped to objectively assess our values, we should contemplate whether our interpretation of evil resonates true because the atrocities of the Holocaust are different, or whether the distinctions we’ve draw are merely a product of convenience.