Since its enactment in 1994, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ (”DADT”), the law
banning openly gay, lesbian and bisexuals from serving in the United
States military, has resulted in the discharge of approximately 12,500
servicemembers. Of those discharged, approximately 800 qualified as
“mission critical” specialists, a designation comprised of highly
trained individuals such as intelligence officers, medical personnel,
pilots and linguists. The cost to the U.S. military of discharging and
replacing servicemembers during its first decade alone has been
estimated at $364 million. These economic costs, the military’s
recent difficulties fulfilling its recruiting quotas and society’s
evolving attitude towards homosexuality have prompted many
policy-makers, government officials, and military personnel alike to
question the logic of upholding the ban.
Throughout its sixteen-year history, DADT has faced myriad
challenges from both legislative and judicial fronts, but to little
success. Efforts to repeal the ban have repeatedly failed to garner
sufficient support and have stalled in Congress. Similarly, efforts
to overturn the policy through the judiciary have proved equally
unavailing – that is, until very recently. In its 2003 landmark
decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court, in recognizing
a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause for intimate,
consensual homosexual conduct, provided DADT’s opponents with a potent
new weapon with which to attack the law’s constitutionality. DADT
challengers found themselves armed with the persuasive argument that
Lawrence called for a heightened level of scrutiny under substantive
due process for laws concerning homosexual conduct and that DADT, by
targeting gay and lesbian servicemembers for such conduct, is
unconstitutional.
To date, two circuit courts have handed down decisions in cases
challenging DADT’s constitutionality in the wake of Lawrence. In Witt
v. Dep’t of the Air Force, the court acknowledged that Lawrence
required a heightened level of scrutiny in matters pertaining to
homosexual conduct but declined to rule on the merits of plaintiff’s
substantive due process claim, instead remanding it to the lower court
to develop the record. In Cook v. Gates, the court similarly held
that Lawrence established heightened scrutiny but upheld the
constitutionality of DADT on the grounds that the government interest
was compelling enough to overcome a substantive due process challenge,
relying almost exclusively on the doctrine of military deference to
achieve this result.
Both the Witt and Cook courts were correct in interpreting
Lawrence as having established a liberty interest in private,
consensual homosexual conduct protected by due process and subject to
heightened review. As both courts pointed out, to read Lawrence as
doing otherwise would ring inconsistent with both the language of the
opinion and the precedents it relied upon in discussing the liberty
interests at stake. While it may be true that the Court never
expressly used to the term “fundamental” to describe the protected
right, precedent has demonstrated that such an omission is not
dispositive of the Court’s intent. Moreover, as both the Witt and
Cook courts observed, despite the Lawrence court’s discussion of
“legitimate state interests,” it would strain logic trying to
reconcile the Court’s decision to overturn the Texas statute relying
on rational basis since the government’s stated interest in
prohibiting “immoral conduct” likely would have been sufficient to
survive that constitutional challenge. If the Lawrence court had
simply applied rational basis, it merely could have deferred to the
state’s rationale without inquiring much further into the impact of
the law on those affected by it.
Whether these courts erred in applying something less than
strict scrutiny to their analyses of DADT is perhaps more debatable.
Both the Witt and Cookcourts immediately dismissed the application of
strict scrutiny as a possibility. Neither court offered much of an
explanation for this position, save the Wittcourt’s observation that
the Lawrence court never expressly used the “narrowly tailored”
language of strict scrutiny analysis. Indeed, even the Witt dissent,
which argued for strict scrutiny based on the Court’s treatment in
overturning Bowers, seemed to hedge its bets, conceding that even if
strict scrutiny were not appropriate, the Lawrence had intentionally
left this question open to interpretation.
Given Lawrence’s seemingly intentional ambiguity on the subject,
the Witt and Cook courts’s determinations that Lawrence called for
something in between rational basis and strict scrutiny seems fitting.
After all, as both courts acknowledged, the Supreme Court had
demonstrated an openness towards gradations and flexibility in the
application of due process standards (e.g., in Casey and Sell).
Although both courts may arguably be accused of “playing it safe” in
opting for a middle ground approach in their due process analyses,
they were by no means stepping out of appropriate judicial bounds in
so doing.
However, even accepting the Witt and Cook court’s determinations
that Lawrence required heightened review, a question nevertheless
remains as to whether these courts correctly applied that standard to
the cases before them. In Witt, the court relied heavily on the Sell
case to craft a “heightened scrutiny balancing” test comprise of three
distinct prongs: 1) whether the statute implicating the rights in
Lawrence advanced an important government interest; 2) whether the
intrusion by that law on those rights significantly furthered that
interest; and 3) whether the intrusion was necessary to further that
interest. Since the Witt court chose to remand the case for
development of the record, it is unclear at this juncture how this
test will play out in the end. What is worth noting, however,
especially in relation to the approach adopted by the Cook court, is
that the Witt court clearly delineated between the state’s interest,
including within that rubric the court’s interest in deferring to
Congress on military matters, and both the proportionality and
necessity of the law’s intrusion on those affected by it. Thus, while
acknowleging that this protected liberty interest must occasionally
cede to a state’s interest, the Witt court was careful to strike a
balance that would preserve that right if the law in question was too
invasive.
In stark contrast, the Cook court, though also stating that it
was applying a balancing test inspired by Lawrence, failed to strike
such a balance. Whereas under the Witt balancing test, the concept of
military deference was accorded some weight in determining the
relative importance of the state’s interest, Cook’s analysis accorded
this doctrine so much weight that it overwhelmed all other
considerations: “This is an exceedingly weighty interest and one that
unquestionably surpasses the government interest that was at stake in
Lawrence.”
It is odd that after spending so much time developing the
argument that Lawrence created a liberty interest in private,
consensual homosexual conduct, the Cook court then gave such
shortshrift to analyzing the intrusive effects of DADT on the liberty
interest of homosexual servicemember. The court focuses almost
exclusively on Congress’s interest in controlling military affairs,
providing little to no counter-balancing argument. Given this rather
lop-sided analysis, one cannot help but wonder whether the Cook court
utilized the military doctrine as a means of avoiding the clear
implications of Lawrence: that is, that if subjected to heightened
scrutiny, DADT would likely have to be overturned.
Indeed, there is a strong argument that the Cook court’s appeal
to the doctrine of military deference was inappropriate given the
constitutional context of the decision before it. Although there are
some instances where judiciary’s use of the doctrine is clearly
appropriate, it is also generally recognized that, where an
individual’s constitutional rights are threatened, the judiciary often
has a to protect those rights.
The now-infamous case of Korematsu v. United States is an
oft-cited example of how the Supreme Court failed to protect those
rights in deference to military policy. In Korematsu, the Court
deferred to a military order forcing Japanese-Americans into
internment camps because military leaders had determined that they
posed a “threat” to national security. However, significant evidence
exists indicating that many of the military commanders who supported
the internment policy were motivated not by genuine concern for
national security, but by political and racial bias. Today, the
Court’s willingness to defer to the military’s intrusion on the rights
of Japanese-Americans is almost uniformerly regarded as a stain on the
Court’s record. In relying on the doctrine of military deference to
uphold the constitutionality of DADT, the Cook court arguably commits
a similar transgression in allowing military policy to trample on the
liberty interests of gay and lesbian servicemembers.
Andrew Baroody