By D. Hsu
A month ago, federal authorities arrested Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis for trying to blow up the Federal Reserve Bank of New York with what he thought was 1,000 pounds of explosives. Luckily for New York City denizens, the bomb was actually a dud prepared by federal authorities and the NYPD, given to Nafis in an undercover anti-terrorism investigation.
Reports have described Nafis more as a bumbling paper tiger than a terrorist mastermind. The ambitious 21-year-old Bangledeshi man came to the U.S. on a student visa with the sole purpose of waging jihad, but soon caught the FBI’s attention when he unwittingly approached an FBI informant to be his accomplice. As the FBI tracked Nafis in the months that followed, it became clear that Nafis lacked both the resources and wit required to carry out a terrorist attack. Although Nafis supported Al Qaeda ideology, he had no real connection to the organization whatsoever. One can only wonder if Nafis’ ambitions would have ever amounted to a threatening act if the government had not interfered.
Defense attorneys have often accused the federal government of entrapping would-be terrorists. They argue that the government persuades perpetrators to commit terrorist attacks rather than finding the perpetrators ready and willing to commit them. If the allegations against Nafis are true—that he came to the U.S. solely to wage jihad and he actively sought out accomplices—he was indeed found ready and willing and was not entrapped. However, statistics suggest that Nafis would not be in any better a position if the facts were any grayer. 100% of the jihadist terrorism cases involving an undercover agent that have gone to trial since 9/11 have resulted in either a guilty plea or conviction—notably greater than the 77% rate of guilty pleas or convictions for non-jihadist terrorism cases. Then there is still the looming question of whether the great lengths that the government has taken to arrest jihadist paper tigers like Nafis look more like witch hunts than safety measures.
The American public has been understandably sensitive to jihadist terrorism plots since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This public sentiment could very well be affecting criminal investigations and judicial outcomes, compromising the legal system and its pursuit of justice when handling jihadist terrorist suspects. In pop culture media, we often rally for justice to prevail over public sentiment. In To Kill a Mockingbird, we beg the white jury of the 1930s Deep South to set an obviously innocent Black man free. In HBO’s John Adams miniseries, we attribute great virtues to our second President for defying angry Colonial mobs and defending the much reviled—and innocent—British soldiers in court. The examples in our literature, music, and movies are abundant. But could we make that same rally cry for justice in present situations that are much more personal to us? Could we ever sympathize with a jihadist terrorist suspect like Nafis? And if justice truly called for it, could we ever let a jihadist terrorist suspect go free?
Great post. Nafis’s arrest and the alarming statistics of jihad convictions does seem to be a modern day example of politics trumping the legal. Its easy to say, while reading books like To Kill a Mockingbird or The Book of Daniel, which center around convictions that are clearly politically motivated, that those convictions were morally wrong. Its easy to be outraged for Tom Robinson and the Isaacsons.
However, it is quite difficult to say in today’s post 9/11 world that you wish the law was more impartial to suspected terrorists. Of course, the Atticus Finch in all of us wants every person to be treated equally under the law. But its difficult to make that argument when you think that the government’s preemptive actions, while verging on entrapment in some instances, may have saved lives.
Either way this is an excellent modern day example of the tensions between politics and the law.
Your post notes that “100% of the jihadist terrorism cases involving an undercover that have gone to trial since 9/11 have resulted in either a guilty plea or a conviction.” This raises an interesting question about our treatment of terror suspects in general. We are ofteb told that Guantanamo detainees cannot be tried in Federal Court on US soil because the risks are too great, but this statistic suggests wer are surely more than capable.
I found this sentence particularly intriguing: “And if justice truly called for it, could we ever let a jihadist terrorist suspect go free?”
If the hypothetical “jihadist terrorist” suspect was merely suspected of being a jihadist terrorist, but was known to be innocent, then I don’t think Americans for the most part would have a problem with him being released. It is of course absurd to continue to incarcerate someone who has been proven not to be a jihadist terrorist who was suspected of being one.
I think part of the unique problem here is that in the John Adams miniseries and To Kill a Mockingbird, the suspects are being harassed because of who they are not what they are accused of. So, perhaps the more specific question is would a middle-eastern muslim suspected of terrorism have a lesser shot at being found innocent. I guess the statistics answer that question.
Great post. I do share the concern of defense attorneys that there is a lot of interference of the government in these terrorism cases. For example would Shahawar Matin Siraj ever thought of bombing the 34th street subway station if he wouldn’t have met (police informant) Osama Eldawoody who could supply the explosives. But on the other hand: What if Siraj would have come up with the same plan and used another supplier? Or in this case what if the government didn’t supply the explosives? Is the fear of too much interference worth the risk of doing nothing?
The line between ‘witch hunt’ and protecting the public safety isn’t always very clear and it involves a lot of politics. Are these politics trumping the legal? I don’t know.
The statics suggest that the public sentiment plays a big role in terrorism cases. Is this an accurate picture or does the DA’s office simply build a stronger case, because they can’t afford to lose? And if the latter is true, isn’t that also an example of the politics trumping the legal? Lots of questions with no clear answers. But cases like these makes you wonder about what we discussed a lot in class: the politics trumping the legal trumping the moral and how to deal with that.
This is a really interesting post, and something that I’m a bit embarrassed to say that I had not considered before. I agree with Tom – it makes me think of the Guantanamo detainees and raises a similar question about moral justice. When trying to stop terrorism, in defense of our collective nation, how far is too far? Knowing that the terrorism plot was not necessarily Nafis’s idea makes you wonder whether he would have truly been able to carry out such an attack on his own – especially if, as you say, he didn’t have the resources to do so. But then again, are we willing to take that risk if it s at the expense of the lives of thousands of Americans? My inclination, whether moral or not, is to say – not a chance.
The American public’s fear of jihadist terrorism plots has led to the controversial practice of targeted killings. For example, President Barack Obama personally authorized the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a senior figure in Al Qaeda but also an American citizen. Al-Awlaki was killed by a drone strike in Yemen on September 30, 2011. While it’s true that al-Awlaki was a threat to national security in that he was an instigator of jihadist terror plots, he was killed without being formally charged with a crime or standing trial and being convicted. The due process clause of the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person may be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” There is no question that targeted killing denies the suspected terrorist their fundamental rights, but is this a necessary evil worth overriding the Constitution for?
In the terrorism context, investigators and prosecutors constantly are put to decisions on how best to handle a particular subject of investigation. Judgments about their relative threat, commitment to jihad, potential as an informant or for rehabilitation, etc., are made based on discrete, personal information and knowledge. One would hope that the same backstory, whether inculpatory or mitigating, could be presented in the public forum at trial.
I think this post speaks to the deficiency in the criminal justice mechanism to illuminate the backstory. The image of terror suspects almost uniformly presented in the media lacks personal specificity. The picture often developed is evocative of political scientist John DiIulio’s description of juvenile offenders in the 1990s as “superpredators.” Here, just as in DiIulio’s case, much benefit would come from deeper understanding of the individual.
Informative post .. you have dug out many issues in which we need to think a lot … Hope to get more post from you …